Simon Bachelor is Head of Drones Programme at the British Transport Police.
With an extensive 30-year career as a police officer, Simon’s current tasks include delivering the programme against the force’s strategy and reducing disruption across the rail sector.
He also leads on communication with aviation, risk and regulatory contractors, and oversees work on risk quantification and the safe and responsible implementation of a BVLOS capability for the police force.
Simon has been working on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems since 2019, under the NPCC Counter Drones portfolio and as an embedded member of the Home Office Counter Drones Unit, and took on his current role in April 2025.
What fundamental problem were you trying to solve when developing the drone-in-a-box programme, and how did you prioritise early use cases such as trespass, obstruction, or cable theft?
Defining the problem space was a key activity as we sought to develop a BVLOS drone capability. We identified a number of use cases and prioritised trespass and disruption, because that actually covers most of the use cases anyway.
From there we identified that the drone-in-a-box solution is really well suited to covering our trespass and disruption hotspots.
What does success look like in the next 12 months for your team? Which metrics (e.g., reduction in delays, faster incident response, cost savings, officer time released) matter most?
All of those! We have done some benchmarking of benefits and once our drone-in-a-boxes start generating data we can look at benefits realisation.
We will identify a number of key metrics and how we can measure any benefits (which may be financial or time related for example), plus be able to articulate the benefits in using the drones to pro-actively patrol these locations.
BTP is the first UK force to routinely operate under State Aircraft BVLOS provisions. How did you build a legally robust, repeatable framework around that?
Yes, although other forces also have a similar capability, all operating slightly differently. But, we are
operating at a larger scale than anyone else.
The first step for us was to obtain legal advice, which gave us the basis to proceed – we were the
first force to do this and we shared the advice with our policing colleagues. The framework we use developed the force’s already mature drone operation and processes and is based around a ‘5 Towers model’: Leadership Governance and Capability Management, Risk Management, Competency Management, Fleet and Mission Systems Management, and Flight Operations Management.
Image courtesy of the British Transport Police
How closely does your operational model align to the UK CAA’s CAP3182 Future of Flight BVLOS Roadmap?
We work closely with our biggest partner, Network Rail. They are currently progressing a SORA application for drone-in-a-box based on our processes, technology and methodology, whereas we use State Aircraft exemptions.
We operate within regulation where possible, with an acceptance that some policing operations cannot be catered for by current regulation and that’s when we need to utilise State Aircraft exemptions, with an appropriate means by which the regulator can ensure these operations are safe.
How have you approached detect-and-avoid and airspace deconfliction, especially considering possible interactions with NPAS, HEMS, or other emergency aviation assets?
NPAS and HEMS are our biggest risk, given that we are effectively conducting all our drone-in-a-box operations in an Atypical Airspace Environment, below 200 feet.
To that end, we use existing policing technology to be aware of where and when both are operating. In addition, we are working closely with Dronecloud and Network Rail on a UTM system for the railway as well as others on a form of Electronic Conspicuity using novel sensors.
We have developed a means to use transponders on all our drone-in-a-box drones, which means we can be seen. Lastly, good communication with both our own and other users is essential!
What is your strategy for dealing with critical events like GNSS disruption, C2 link loss, or EMI around railway power infrastructure?
Having a background in Counter Drones, I know that there can be some disruption, although it is less than people think. Link loss is more common, particularly at lower levels around infrastructure, so we use a mesh network to increase signal reliability and the telephony network as a failsafe.
Image courtesy of the British Transport Police
Your remote operations centre at London Bridge is impressive. How do operators coordinate drone dispatch, mission approval, and real-time decision support from the control room?
Thank you! Our operations room has been built from scratch, with no real blueprint for using multiple drone-in-a-boxes.
What we have done is to ensure we can integrate with existing operations, based around our current drone capability, using the same processes.
How is live drone data fed into incident response workflows? Who sees what, and how does drone
footage accelerate on-scene decision-making?
As mentioned, we use existing processes, so there is no real change to the way of working for us. We can get imagery to key decision-makers across both the BTP and Network Rail, but clearly we need to make sure those decision-makers understand who is the key decision-maker in any incident. There is two-way communication with the pilots as well, so the drone can be re-directed as required.
What training and competency framework did you build for BVLOS operators?
We follow the NPCC guidance on training for pilots (which does include a BVLOS element), but have developed our own training for what we do as operating drone-in-a-box is uniquely different.
Image courtesy of the British Transport Police
Was there any resistance internally, and how did you help frontline officers trust an autonomous asset arriving ahead of them?
Communication is important, particularly getting across that we’re not replacing officers or taking away options to use the drones we have, that we’re simply focussing on our trespass and disruption hotspots.
We’re also managing expectations by communicating things like the locations we have the drone-in a-box, how far we can fly and how long the drone can be airborne.
We’re in a good place as most officers are now used to working with drones and this is just an
extension of that capability.
What privacy safeguards guide how you collect, store, review, and delete drone imagery captured
near stations, homes, or public spaces?
We have very strict rules relating to data and privacy, as you would expect. We only record incidents
if there is a policing purpose, operating with a pilot and a tactical flight officer, plus a supervisor, so
the safeguards are there. In addition, we record the room (mostly for safety reasons should an accident occur), but this adds to the level of professionalism we require.
How do you secure the box, the drone, and your communications channels against tampering, interference, or cyber threats?
All our equipment goes through a cyber-assurance process. It’s not about the imagery or necessarily the data, it is about unwarranted access to our wider systems. We have layered security for our hardware, not only to prevent damage or tampering, but to prevent accidents with uninvolved persons who may be nearby.
Image from Moonrock’s visit to BTP in 2026
How do you collaborate with Network Rail, TOCs/FOCs, and infrastructure partners to ensure seamless integration between policing, rail operations, and drone data flows?
This is a really good question. We have recently begun work on a Concept of Joint Operations, supported by both the BTP Chief Constable and the CEO of Network Rail. Here we’re looking at coordinating our drone efforts across rail, using each other’s assets and sharing drone imagery whether for infrastructure inspection or searching for trespassers. There is lots to do here and for us to look at, from a National Drone Flight Operations Room to a National Drone Response Team!
What does a scalable national deployment model look like in terms of infrastructure density, maintenance, operator staffing, and cost-effectiveness?
I think there has to be a limit to the number of assets we have, the real key to this is flexibility. The ability to move assets dependent on demand has to be the most cost-effective solution. The challenge is that our assets are adding value and that we can demonstrate the benefits!
What single enabler – technical, regulatory, or organisational – would most accelerate safe, scalable BVLOS policing in the UK? And how can industry partners best support that future?
I think the first enabler I would want is an agreed regulatory model that allows us to operate within regulation where we can, but where we need to we have a framework for the use of ‘State Aircraft’
exemptions to achieve policing objectives.
This in itself presents an opportunity for industry players to partner with policing or other agencies,
which would benefit the industry more widely.
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