A £300m government initiative promised a new era of drones and flying taxis. But an official evaluation reveals an industry plagued by regulatory delays, a lack of commercial focus and an infrastructure gap that threatens to leave the UK lagging behind international rivals.
When the government launched the Future Flight Challenge in 2019, it promised to position Britain at the vanguard of the third aviation revolution. The £300m initiative – combining £125m in public funds with a minimum of £175m from industry – was designed to propel unmanned aerial systems, advanced air mobility and regional electric aircraft from the drawing board into the skies.
Yet a newly published final evaluation of the programme paints a sobering picture of a sector struggling to translate research and development into viable commercial services. Hamstrung by regulatory bottlenecks, a precarious funding landscape and profound infrastructure deficits, the industry’s ambitions are at risk of remaining permanently grounded.
The comprehensive evaluation, conducted by Frontier Economics, Frazer-Nash Consultancy and BMG Research, confirms that while the initiative successfully fostered collaboration and leveraged an impressive £217m in industry co-investment, the transition to in-service operations has severely stalled. For the small and medium-sized enterprises at the heart of this innovation, the failure to clear these hurdles presents an existential threat.
The regulatory bottleneck
The most persistent grievance among industry pioneers is the sluggish pace of regulatory approval. The Civil Aviation Authority, the UK’s aviation regulator, is widely perceived by the industry as a severe bottleneck. According to the evaluation survey, 51% of respondents now view regulation as a barrier to technological progress, while the proportion rating the regulator’s demonstration approval process as ‘extremely inefficient’ has surged from 9% at the interim evaluation to 23%.
Industry insiders suggest that post-Brexit resource constraints have severely hindered the regulator’s capacity to keep pace with rapid technological advancements. ‘In the past few years, we have dealt with the consequences of Brexit, which significantly hindered CAA’s capacity to develop regulation as quickly as other countries,’ noted one regulatory stakeholder.
The consequences of these delays are stark. A staggering 41% of respondents believe the UK now lags behind most countries in regulatory innovation, a sharp increase from just 17% when the programme began. Competitors in the US are benefiting from larger funding pools and flexible waiver approaches for commercial drone operations, while European Union countries enjoy a greater uptake of electronic conspicuity devices among traditional aircraft. Meanwhile, nations such as Canada and Australia capitalise on vast unoccupied spaces for testing, and China has aggressively designated airspace below 500ft exclusively for drones.
In Britain, testing has often been confined to isolated temporary danger areas, which fail to replicate the complex, integrated airspace required for business-as-usual operations. While the recent introduction of the UK Specific Operations Risk Assessment – developed in collaboration with the British Standards Institution – provides a glimmer of hope for a more flexible framework, stakeholders warn that the regulatory timeline remains wildly out of sync with commercial realities.
‘The UK has traditionally been seen as a gold standard regulator, it is very well respected in terms of BVLOS [beyond visual line of sight] policies, but it is definitely not top of the world because it is harder in the UK than in other countries,’ admitted a regulator interviewed for the evaluation.
The ‘valley of death’ for small businesses
The financial realities facing future flight enterprises are equally daunting. While the Future Flight Challenge successfully seeded the market and supported groundbreaking projects, the industry is now confronting a perilous ‘valley of death’ between prototyping and commercialisation.
SMEs, which comprise the bulk of the sector’s innovators, warn that current funding levels are barely sufficient to keep the lights on. Many fear that once the programme concludes in 2025, they will not survive more than 12 months without sustained, long-term investment. The proportion of survey respondents viewing private sector investment as a barrier has more than doubled, rising from 15% at baseline to 32% in the final evaluation.
Economic uncertainty, inflation and post-Brexit complications have cooled investor appetite, leaving UK firms at a distinct disadvantage compared with their US and EU counterparts. As one industry figure put it, there is a risk that the UK will endure a ‘lost decade’ of innovation if government support dries up and domestic start-ups are either forced into administration or bought out by foreign competitors.
‘The UK is known for promoting innovation but struggles historically to commercialise,’ observed one industry stakeholder.
Commercialisation spread too thinly
A recurring criticism in the evaluation is that the programme spread its funding too thinly across a myriad of futuristic use cases, rather than concentrating resources on bringing a select few to commercial maturity.
‘If you try to do too much, then you end up not getting any of those to market and we don’t go anywhere,’ lamented one large organisation representative. Instead of demonstrating an end-to-end commercial service – which would validate business models, supply chains and regulatory pathways – projects often remained stuck in the prototyping phase.
Despite these missteps, some projects have successfully showcased the potential of future flight technologies. Project CAELUS has trialled the distribution of medical products and medicines across Scotland using a network of electric drones, while Open Skies Cornwall is establishing ‘sky highways’ to connect the NHS, Royal Mail and local authority assets. Similarly, Project Lifeline has demonstrated how drones can deliver critical medical equipment such as defibrillators and anti-bleeding kits directly to emergency scenes.
However, these successes represent a fraction of the sector’s broader potential. The evaluation notes that a robust future flight supply chain is virtually non-existent, leaving manufacturers without the raw materials, energy and transportation networks required to scale up operations.
The infrastructure and skills deficit
This lack of commercial readiness is further complicated by the UK’s crowded and complex airspace. The slow uptake of electronic conspicuity devices among traditional general aviation users makes integrating drones and air taxis an incredibly thorny issue. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure required to support these new vehicles – such as vertiports, charging stations and robust electricity networks – is severely underdeveloped.
The sector is also grappling with a growing skills deficit. As projects advance towards higher technology readiness levels, the demand for specialised expertise in digital technologies, systems engineering, autonomous systems oversight and uncrewed traffic management has skyrocketed. Correspondingly, 38% of survey respondents now view workforce skills as a barrier, up from just 18% when the programme launched.
While the challenge allocated £500,000 towards upskilling programmes and educational outreach, including partnerships with the Institute of Engineering Technology, industry leaders warn that bridging this gap will require a far more comprehensive national strategy.
Net zero illusions and public scepticism
The promise of zero-emission flight has been a central pillar of the initiative, aligning with the government’s ambitious net zero targets. Electric and hydrogen-powered air vehicles produce no operational carbon emissions, offering a tantalising alternative to diesel-powered freight and passenger transport. A report published by PwC estimated that future flight technologies could reduce carbon emissions in the UK by 222 million tonnes of CO2e per year by 2040, providing an equivalent of over £24bn in monetary value to society.
Yet, the evaluation reveals that the industry has done little to quantify the full lifecycle environmental impact of these technologies. The carbon footprint of battery manufacturing, electricity grid emissions and end-of-life disposal threatens to offset operational savings. Without rigorous, scaled-up environmental modelling, the net zero benefits of future flight remain largely theoretical.
Public perception is similarly precarious. Research conducted alongside the programme found that while 95% of the UK public are familiar with drones, a mere 28% have heard of electric vertical take-off and landing vehicles. Although there is broad support for operations that serve the public good – such as emergency medical deliveries or rural connectivity – significant anxieties persist regarding privacy, noise, safety and visual pollution.
Qualitative research from a deliberative public dialogue revealed that citizens expect these technologies to align with public good principles, including affordability, inclusivity and environmental sustainability. Industry veterans caution against the marketing hype surrounding flying taxis. Overpromising futuristic passenger services without first demonstrating safe, routine operations risks alienating a sceptical public.
‘By attempting to achieve something great and not quite getting there, we might have ended up doing something damaging,’ warned one SME leader.
The wider economic footprint
Despite the profound challenges, the potential prize for the UK economy is vast. Companies operating in sectors similar to Future Flight Challenge applicants generated £302bn in turnover in 2023, contributing approximately 4.8% of the UK’s total private sector turnover. This share is comparable to established industries such as construction and information technology, drastically dwarfing the traditional aviation sector, which accounts for less than 1% of the UK’s total turnover.
Gross value added for these wider industries grew by 6% between 2019 and 2022 to reach £288bn, driven largely by non-aviation activities such as business support, consultancy and computer programming, which collectively underpin the future flight ecosystem. If the UK can overcome its regulatory and infrastructure hurdles, the integration of these high-tech services could fundamentally reshape the domestic economy.
A crossroads for UK aviation
The Future Flight Challenge has undoubtedly catalysed a nascent industry, forging unprecedented collaborations and driving critical technological advancements. It has provided a vital platform for British businesses to showcase their innovations on the global stage at events like Farnborough International Airshow. However, the transition from successful test flights in segregated airspace to a thriving, economically viable sector requires a fundamental shift in strategy.
The evaluation underscores an urgent need for a cross-departmental government vision that extends beyond short-term research grants. Regulators must be properly resourced to create flexible, innovation-friendly frameworks, while the industry itself must focus relentlessly on commercialising practical, low-risk use cases rather than chasing disparate technological dreams.
Without a coordinated national effort to build the necessary physical and digital infrastructure, secure long-term private investment and bring a sceptical public on board, Britain’s ambition to lead the third aviation revolution may well remain permanently grounded.
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Ukrainian defence companies Culver Aerospace and GLEFA have unveiled the Behemoth, a new medium-range strike drone that has already been deployed in combat. Details of the new system, which bears visual and operational similarities to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munitions used extensively by Russia, emerged on May 21.
The Behemoth is capable of hitting targets up to 300km (185 miles) away and carrying a payload of up to 75kg (165lb). The drone is equipped with a tandem warhead that combines an explosively formed penetrator—also known as a shock core—with a thermobaric charge. Designed to fly at low altitudes to reduce the likelihood of detection by enemy air defences, the Behemoth can operate autonomously or in FPV mode, using the Starlink system for communication.
The development comes as Ukraine surpasses Russia in the number of long-range drone strikes conducted in a single month. Ukrainian deep-strike drones have increasingly targeted Russian oil refineries, naval infrastructure, airbases and military facilities deep within Russian territory. The developers also introduced a separate Behemoth Deepstrike version, though technical specifications for this variant have not yet been publicly disclosed.
Production and development of such systems are being significantly bolstered by international partnerships. In April, Culver Aerospace signed a cooperation agreement with the German defence firm Helsing to jointly develop and produce drones at a factory in Germany, a project funded by the German government.
Furthermore, on February 24, Culver Aerospace concluded a five-year agreement with Denmark’s Copenhagen Global A/S. This partnership, part of a broader €800m package of accords between Ukrainian and European defence manufacturers, will focus on medium-range systems of up to 400km (250 miles) and long-range strike systems capable of reaching 2,500km (1,550 miles)
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On 20 May 2026, the Law Commission published its final report on aviation autonomy. Commissioned by the Department for Transport and the Civil Aviation Authority, the review addresses the legal barriers to safely deploying highly automated and autonomous systems in aviation. It focuses on three main use cases: drones, advanced air mobility such as vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOLs), and air traffic management. The overarching aim is to ensure that uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) can operate with safety levels equivalent to crewed flights.
A central element of the report is drawing a clear line between remotely piloted and autonomous operations. To ensure legal certainty regarding who is responsible for aviation safety, the commission recommends that any flight where a human pilot can intervene should be classed as remotely piloted, while any flight without this possibility is autonomous. It advises retaining the current legal definition of a remote pilot and aligning their responsibilities with those of a commander in commercial air transport operations.
For passenger-carrying remotely piloted operations, ensuring equivalent safety with crewed aircraft is paramount. The remote pilot will hold ultimate legal responsibility for flight preparation checks, such as ensuring the aircraft is airworthy and that cargo is secured. Furthermore, the remote pilot will have the responsibility to refuse transport to individuals under the influence of drink or drugs. They will also be granted the power to take reasonable measures, including authorising passenger restraint under the Civil Aviation Act 1982, to protect the aircraft and its occupants in emergency situations. Operators will be required to ensure that passengers can contact a crew member at all times.
When operations become fully autonomous, the responsibilities of the pilot will shift significantly to the UAS operator. The operator will be required to use an aircraft designed to comply with operational limitations and avoid the risk of collision. Mandatory flight data recorders are also recommended for autonomous drone and VTOL operations to facilitate accident investigations and improve long-term safety.
The report also examines civil and criminal liability when accidents happen. It states that the current strict liability system will continue to function effectively for air carriers, although product liability relating to artificial intelligence requires a broader review. In terms of criminal law, the commission recommends updating the offence of hijacking under the Aviation Security Act 1982. Recognising that uncrewed aircraft could be seized by technological means or hacking without a hijacker being present on board, the report urges the UK to implement the Beijing Protocol to expand the legal definition of hijacking.
Finally, to safely integrate uncrewed flights beyond the visual line of sight, the report calls for legislative change to accommodate the certification of uncrewed aircraft systems traffic management (UTM) providers. These services will supply vital digital information about potential hazards and weather to uncrewed aircraft, ensuring they can share the airspace safely with crewed flights.
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The first person to sound the alarm was an airport employee who would later become the case’s star witness. Spotting two strange objects hovering and darting across the evening sky, she didn’t hesitate: “There are two drones. They are large. It’s not toys,” she reported up the chain. Within minutes, Danish airspace was closed to everything except emergency landings.
What she saw that night, she later described in vivid detail. One object was a large, square shape, roughly 1.5 by 1.5 metres, that reminded her of a robotic lawnmower with rounded corners and a propeller at each corner. The second was smaller, white, round, and faster. Both had bright white lights. Yet the witness was remarkably candid about her own inexperience: she had never seen a real drone in person in her entire life, only on television, in films, or in the news. “I have not seen any drones physically… but I explain from what I feel, and then it was a drone,” she told investigators. To her, the slow hover that could suddenly accelerate, the propellers, and the lights all added up.
Police, however, reached a very different conclusion. After interviewing her four times and having experts analyse the phone video filmed by her colleague, they were clear: there were no drones. The large moving light captured on the grainy footage was a school training plane from Roskilde that had been cleared to fly in the area. The small, fast-moving “zigzagging” object was simply lens flare, a common reflection inside the camera lens caused by bright external lights. When the witness watched the same video again alongside journalists from Frihedsbrevet, she herself admitted that, yes, it could easily be mistaken for a small aircraft. Police delivered the same message to several of her colleagues: what they had seen were camera artefacts, ordinary aircraft… or, in one later case, a police helicopter.
That last detail reveals a classic false-confirmation loop. Once the initial drone report went out, authorities scrambled a helicopter from the police tactical unit to hunt for the suspected intruders. A colleague who spotted the helicopter later that evening naturally assumed it was yet another drone, only to be told by police that he had actually seen their own response aircraft. The very act of sending up a helicopter in pursuit of reported drones created a new “sighting” that seemed to confirm the original alarm.
Danish public broadcaster DR this week aired a documentary titled “Droner over Danmark” that further underlined concerns about the authorities’ handling of the events, including reports (as first reported by sUAS News) of the Danish military likely mistaking a Norwegian passenger airliner for a drone and firing upon it over Billund.
You can watch the documentary here: https://www.dr.dk/drtv/program/droner-over-danmark_596478
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The continent of Australia presents a unique logistical challenge, particularly across its vast, remote and strategically vital northern regions. For the Australian Defence Force (ADF), maintaining a continuous operational presence across such an expansive and unforgiving landscape demands highly innovative approaches to supply and support. Traditional methods of moving cargo are often stretched to their limits by the sheer scale of the geography.
Enter Project Jericho, the Royal Australian Air Force’s disruptive experimentation programme, which is pioneering the use of autonomous aerial logistics to build what military strategists term fighting depth. Central to this ambitious vision is the JabX, an uncrewed aerial system (UAS) based on the proven Jabiru 400 airframe, designed to transport heavy cargo over long distances. By automating routine cargo movements, the ADF aims to revolutionise its logistics tail, ensuring that dispersed teams remain supported without over-tasking the crewed transport fleet.
To understand the true significance of the JabX and the broader Jericho initiatives, one must consider the geographic and strategic realities of Australia. The north of the country is characterised by immense distances, sparse populations and challenging environmental conditions. Operating in this environment requires a robust and agile logistics network capable of connecting remote airbases, coastal areas and dispersed teams conducting littoral operations.
Traditional crewed aircraft are highly capable, but using them for routine supply runs across such vast distances is an inefficient use of valuable resources and personnel. The air force’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation (JDI) team is directly addressing these challenges. By focusing on autonomous aerial logistics, JDI is attempting to build fighting depth for the air force.
This concept involves creating layers of capability and resilience, ensuring that frontline forces have the continuous, uninterrupted support they need to sustain operations. When routine logistics are handled by autonomous systems, human aviators and crewed platforms are freed up to concentrate on complex decision-making, mission command and tasks that only people can perform, particularly in demanding or contested environments. As the deputy director of disruptive experimentation, Wing Commander Keirin Joyce, noted, these technologies are vital to ensuring the air force is ready for future challenges. He said: “By taking on routine logistics missions, autonomous aircraft will free up our aviators and crewed platforms for the tasks only people can do – particularly in demanding or contested conditions”.
The practical manifestation of this autonomous logistics vision is Project Camel Train, an initiative focused on prototyping and deploying UAS corridors across northern Australia. These dedicated flight corridors are intended to link remote airfields and coastal bases into a seamless, precision delivery network. The primary workhorse chosen for this ambitious undertaking is the JabX. Developed in collaboration with RFDesign, an avionics company based in Brisbane, the JabX is a heavily modified version of the popular Jabiru 400 airframe. The Jabiru 400 is already well regarded in light aviation circles, and adapting it for autonomous flight represents a pragmatic and highly efficient approach to capability development. The JabX is specifically designed for long-haul flights carrying heavy loads, featuring robust avionics, structured pre-flight and in-flight workflows, and an advanced graphical user interface that allows operators to maintain constant mission oversight.
The development process for the JabX highlights the immense benefits of using an existing, proven airframe rather than building a new design from the ground up. The director of Jabiru, Michael Halloran, explained that turning the J400 into an optionally crewed aircraft removes the vast time and resources typically required to develop a completely new platform. This approach drastically accelerates the development of autonomy systems because a safety pilot can be kept on board during the initial phases of test flying. Once the autonomous systems are fully developed, tested and proven, transitioning to a dedicated autonomous logistics platform is relatively straightforward. The final autonomous version will share 80% commonality with the crewed JU30 aircraft, meaning that production can be easily scaled up using existing commercial production lines and supply chains.
Integrating autonomous aircraft into shared airspace is not simply a technological challenge; it is a profound regulatory and safety hurdle. The Jericho team recognises that for autonomous logistics to become a reality, these robotic aircraft must navigate crowded or contested skies as safely as human pilots do. Every single component and system of the JabX is tested step by step as part of a strictly regulated pathway. This rigorous testing begins with human pilots operating in controlled settings. As the technology is proven and the regulatory framework permits, the aircraft gradually transition to higher levels of autonomy. The process is described as careful and transparent, keeping safety at the absolute centre of the programme while still enabling rapid innovation. This step-by-step methodology ensures that the ADF can build fundamental trust in the systems before deploying them for live operations across the vast northern corridors.
A critical enabler for long-range autonomous cargo operations is the ability of the uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) to safely separate itself from other aircraft sharing the airspace. To solve this complex problem, the Jericho team established Project Arena, a companion initiative to Project Camel Train
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Image Ian Hudson
Defining the threat and the scope of the legislation
At the heart of the new provisions is the definition of an ‘uncrewed device’. The bill describes this as any device operating, or designed to operate, autonomously, or to be controlled remotely without a natural person on board. This broad definition ensures that the legislation covers a wide array of technologies, from commercially available quadcopters to sophisticated military surveillance drones.
The primary objective of these new powers is to allow the use of approved counter-device equipment to prevent or detect the use of an uncrewed device in the commission of a ‘relevant offence’ in relation to a defence area or defence property, or to mitigate the risk of a drone being used in such a manner. The equipment must be explicitly approved by a notice in writing from the secretary of state.
The exhaustive list of relevant offences
The bill meticulously defines what constitutes a ‘relevant offence’, linking the counter-drone measures to some of the most serious security legislation in the UK. Under the National Security Act 2023, these offences include obtaining or disclosing protected information (section 1), assisting a foreign intelligence service (section 3), entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK (section 4), unauthorised entry to a prohibited place (section 5), sabotage (section 12) and preparatory conduct (section 18), as well as breaching specific orders under sections 6(1) and 11(1) of that act.
Furthermore, the scope encompasses the collection of information under section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, relevant offences include conduct endangering ships, structures or individuals (section 58) and an owner being liable for the unsafe operation of a ship (section 100(3)). The legislation also extends to the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, specifically offences relating to destroying ships or fixed platforms or endangering their safety under section 11.
Aviation-specific violations under the Air Navigation Order 2016 are prominently featured. These include flying certain unmanned aircraft over or near aerodromes without permission (article 94A), prohibited or restricted flying (article 239(4)), endangering the safety of an aircraft (article 240) and endangering the safety of any person or property (article 241).
Lastly, offences against byelaws made under part 2 of the Military Lands Act 1892, which covers land used for military purposes, and offences under orders in council relating to the Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865 are included. To ensure the law can adapt to future threats, the secretary of state retains the power to amend this list of offences by regulations.
Defining defence areas and properties
The powers granted by the bill are geographically bound to the protection of a ‘defence area’ or ‘defence property’. A defence property is defined as any property in the UK used for specific defence purposes. A defence area includes any land (including Crown land) or building in the UK, areas of sea, tidal water or shore to which byelaws apply under the Military Lands Act 1900 or the Land Powers (Defence) Act 1958, and areas of water within a dockyard port regulated by the 1865 act.
The phrase ‘UK defence purposes’ is defined broadly. It covers the activities of His Majesty’s forces; the invention, development, production, operation, storage or disposal of weapons, equipment or capabilities; military planning, defence policy, strategy and intelligence; and plans and measures for the maintenance of essential supplies and services needed by the UK in time of war. Crucially, the provisions also extend to foreign military forces, covering the activities, capability development and weapons management of armed forces from a foreign country or territory allied with or operating within the UK.
The authorisation framework: seniority and oversight
To ensure that these significant powers are not misused, the bill establishes a strict hierarchy for the authorisation of counter-drone equipment. An application for an authorisation can only be made by a person subject to service law, a civilian subject to service discipline, or a member of the civil service working within the Ministry of Defence.
An ‘authorising officer’ must grant the approval. The legislation defines this officer as a senior military figure of at least the rank of rear admiral, major general or air vice-marshal, or a member of the senior civil service of a specified seniority. Before granting an authorisation, this officer must believe that an uncrewed device has been, or is being, used to commit a relevant offence, or that there is a risk of it being so used. Crucially, the authorising officer must also believe that granting the authorisation is appropriate in the interests of national security.
Authorisations must generally be given in writing. They must specify the particular defence area, defence property or description of property where the equipment will be used. They must also state the period for which the authorisation is valid, which cannot exceed 12 months from the day it takes effect. An authorisation may be given generally for approved equipment or limited to specific descriptions of equipment.
Moreover, the authorisation must specify the required seniority of the ‘responsible person’ who will oversee the operation on the ground. This responsible person must be a member of the armed forces of at least the rank of lieutenant commander, major or squadron leader, or a suitably senior civil servant. The approved equipment may only be used if this responsible person is satisfied that it will be used strictly in accordance with the authorisation, and that its use is both necessary and proportionate for the stated purposes.
Fast-track protocols for urgent threats
Recognising that threats to national security can emerge rapidly and without warning, the bill provides a fast-track procedure for situations requiring urgent consideration. If it is not reasonably practicable for a standard authorising officer to consider an application, the power to grant an authorisation can be exercised by a ‘designated person’.
A designated person must be a military officer of at least the rank of commodore, brigadier or air commodore, or a specified member of the senior civil service. In these urgent scenarios, the authorisation may be given orally, bypassing the standard written requirement, but it will only remain valid for a maximum of 72 hours.
If the threat persists, these urgent authorisations can be renewed. A designated person can renew an urgent authorisation on one occasion only for a further period of up to 72 hours. Alternatively, a standard authorising officer can step in to renew the authorisation for up to 12 months. This tiered approach ensures that frontline personnel have the immediate operational flexibility they need, while maintaining strict long-term executive oversight. Authorisations can also be varied or revoked by an authorising officer at any time.
The scope of interference and lawfulness of action
When a valid authorisation is in place, the military is granted significant powers to neutralise the threat. Any action taken is considered lawful for all purposes, provided it is authorised by the framework. This includes interfering with an uncrewed device at any place in the UK, as well as in, above, or below the adjacent territorial sea.
Interference explicitly includes the seizure and retention of the drone. However, the military is not intended to hold civilian property indefinitely. If a device is seized and retained, and not immediately returned to its owner or another appropriate person, it must be delivered to a civilian police constable within 72 hours of its seizure. If the drone was captured at sea, this 72-hour window begins when the device first reaches land in the UK.
Once the device is in the possession of the police, existing civilian laws regarding recovered property apply. These include the Police (Property) Act 1897 in England and Wales, part 6 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 in Scotland (disregarding references to the finder of the property), and section 31 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998.
It is important to note that while the powers of interference are broad, they are not absolute. The bill explicitly states that nothing in this new part authorises the taking of any action that is prohibited by parts 1 to 7, or chapter 1 of part 9, of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, thereby preserving existing legal safeguards against unlawful surveillance and the interception of communications.
Preparedness: testing and training
A crucial component of effective defence is the ability to operate complex counter-drone technology safely and efficiently. To this end, the bill allows authorisations to be granted specifically for testing or training activities, either in addition to or instead of active operational purposes.
Testing activities include the testing, maintenance or development of the approved counter-device equipment. Training activities involve training personnel to use the equipment for the purpose of preventing or detecting drone-related offences. Crucially, the stringent requirement that an authorising officer must believe a relevant offence is actively occurring, or at risk of occurring, does not apply to authorisations granted solely for testing and training. Furthermore, the legislation ensures that no criminal liability is incurred in respect of any action taken so far as it is authorised for these training and testing activities.
Conclusion
The armed forces bill represents a highly structured modernisation of the military’s legal toolkit. By formalising the definition of uncrewed devices, exhaustively listing relevant security offences, and detailing the exact ranks and procedures required to authorise interference, the government is attempting to strike a careful balance. The legislation provides the armed forces with the agility to respond to immediate aerial threats through 72-hour oral authorisations, while ensuring long-term deployments of counter-drone technologies are subject to rigorous oversight by senior military and civil service officials. As uncrewed technology continues to proliferate, these precise powers will be essential to safeguarding the UK’s defence infrastructure.
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