Ukrainian defence companies Culver Aerospace and GLEFA have unveiled the Behemoth, a new medium-range strike drone that has already been deployed in combat. Details of the new system, which bears visual and operational similarities to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munitions used extensively by Russia, emerged on May 21.
The Behemoth is capable of hitting targets up to 300km (185 miles) away and carrying a payload of up to 75kg (165lb). The drone is equipped with a tandem warhead that combines an explosively formed penetrator—also known as a shock core—with a thermobaric charge. Designed to fly at low altitudes to reduce the likelihood of detection by enemy air defences, the Behemoth can operate autonomously or in FPV mode, using the Starlink system for communication.
The development comes as Ukraine surpasses Russia in the number of long-range drone strikes conducted in a single month. Ukrainian deep-strike drones have increasingly targeted Russian oil refineries, naval infrastructure, airbases and military facilities deep within Russian territory. The developers also introduced a separate Behemoth Deepstrike version, though technical specifications for this variant have not yet been publicly disclosed.
Production and development of such systems are being significantly bolstered by international partnerships. In April, Culver Aerospace signed a cooperation agreement with the German defence firm Helsing to jointly develop and produce drones at a factory in Germany, a project funded by the German government.
Furthermore, on February 24, Culver Aerospace concluded a five-year agreement with Denmark’s Copenhagen Global A/S. This partnership, part of a broader €800m package of accords between Ukrainian and European defence manufacturers, will focus on medium-range systems of up to 400km (250 miles) and long-range strike systems capable of reaching 2,500km (1,550 miles)
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News and Commentary.
A new statement from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association may have implications far beyond general aviation airport fees.
This week, AOPA publicly supported comments from FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford opposing the use of ADS-B data for billing and fee collection. The discussion emerged during Senate debate over aviation safety legislation following the fatal 2025 collision between a regional jet and a military helicopter near Washington, D.C.
At first glance, the issue appears narrow. Pilots and aviation groups do not want airport operators or local governments using ADS-B broadcasts to collect landing fees or taxes.
But underneath that debate is a much larger question that directly affects the drone industry: What happens if operators stop trusting electronic visibility systems?
That question sits at the center of what aviation regulators increasingly describe as “universal conspicuity,” the idea that every aircraft operating in shared airspace electronically identifies itself and broadcasts its location.
For drones, that future depends heavily on systems like Remote ID and future UAS Traffic Management (UTM) services.
If operators begin to see those systems as enforcement or monetization tools instead of safety tools, participation could become much more difficult.
ADS-B Was Built for Safety, Not Revenue Collection
ADS-B, or Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, was designed as a situational awareness and collision avoidance system for crewed aircraft.
Aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out continuously broadcast their position, altitude, speed, and identification information. The system helps pilots and air traffic managers maintain awareness of nearby traffic.
During the Senate hearing, Sen. Tim Sheehy argued that using ADS-B data for billing creates incentives for operators to avoid broadcasting altogether. FAA Administrator Bedford agreed, stating that ADS-B “was intended to be a safety and situational awareness tool,” not a tax collection mechanism.
The debate centers on the proposed Pilot and Aircraft Privacy Act (PAPA), portions of which were incorporated into the House-passed Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act. The legislation would prohibit the use of ADS-B data for fee collection.
For the drone industry, however, the larger significance lies in the behavioral argument behind the legislation.
If operators believe visibility systems will be used against them financially or operationally, some may try to avoid participation. That concern already exists in the drone ecosystem.
Remote ID Created Similar Tensions
The FAA’s Remote ID framework effectively serves as a digital license plate system for drones. The rule requires most drones to broadcast identification and location information during flight.
Remote ID became fully enforceable in 2024. From the beginning, the rule generated resistance from some recreational pilots, FPV operators, privacy advocates, and commercial users. Critics argued that publicly broadcast location data could expose sensitive operations, business activity, infrastructure inspections, or proprietary flight patterns.
Industry advocates generally accepted Remote ID as a necessary step toward broader integration into the National Airspace System. Many also recognized that advanced operations such as beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) flight would likely require some form of cooperative electronic visibility.
Still, the rule established an important precedent: aircraft operating in shared low-altitude airspace may be expected to continuously broadcast their identity and location.
Universal Conspicuity Is Becoming Part of a Larger Digital Infrastructure
The aviation industry increasingly assumes that future airspace will rely on networked visibility.
That includes:
- ADS-B
- Remote ID
- UTM systems
- Network-based traffic management
- Cooperative detect-and-avoid systems
- Digital routing and authorization systems
For drone operators, especially those conducting BVLOS flights, electronic visibility may eventually become unavoidable.
But conspicuity is no longer just a transponder problem.
It is becoming part of a much larger digital aviation infrastructure built around constant connectivity, shared situational awareness, and automated coordination between aircraft and ground systems.
In traditional aviation, ADS-B primarily functions as a broadcast system for traffic awareness. In the drone ecosystem, however, visibility systems are increasingly tied to software platforms, network services, cloud-based management tools, and regulatory compliance frameworks.
The FAA’s BVLOS proposal references electronically detectable aircraft and alternative methods of electronic conspicuity as part of scalable airspace integration. That evolution changes the stakes surrounding visibility systems.
As aircraft become more digitally connected, operators may begin asking broader questions about how broadcast and tracking data could eventually be used for:
- operational monitoring
- automated enforcement
- airspace access management
- infrastructure coordination
- future fee structures
The AOPA debate over ADS-B billing highlights why those concerns matter.
The Industry Already Sees the Privacy Debate Emerging
Researchers have increasingly examined the tension between accountability and privacy in Remote ID systems.
Several academic studies have warned that publicly broadcast drone location data could allow persistent tracking of operators or sensitive operations. Other researchers have explored authenticated Remote ID systems designed to prevent spoofing while maintaining operational utility.
Those debates may become more important as drone traffic scales.
The drone industry has largely accepted the idea that electronic visibility is necessary for integration. The unresolved question is how that visibility data will ultimately be used.
The Risk to Airspace Integration
The core challenge is not technological. It is behavioral. Universal conspicuity only works if operators willingly participate.
If pilots or drone operators begin to see electronic visibility primarily as a liability rather than a safety benefit, participation incentives may weaken.
That creates a difficult balancing act for regulators. The FAA, NASA, industry groups, and technology providers all envision increasingly connected low-altitude airspace. Those systems promise safer integration between drones, helicopters, advanced air mobility aircraft, and traditional aviation.
But connected airspace requires trust.
AOPA’s opposition to ADS-B billing highlights an issue the drone industry may soon face at much larger scale:
once a safety system becomes associated with surveillance, enforcement, or monetization, operators may begin treating visibility itself as a liability.
For an aviation system increasingly built around universal conspicuity, that could become a serious problem.
Read more:
Miriam McNabb is the Editor-in-Chief of DRONELIFE and CEO of JobForDrones, a professional drone services marketplace, and a fascinated observer of the emerging drone industry and the regulatory environment for drones. Miriam has penned over 3,000 articles focused on the commercial drone space and is an international speaker and recognized figure in the industry. Miriam has a degree from the University of Chicago and over 20 years of experience in high tech sales and marketing for new technologies.
For drone industry consulting or writing, Email Miriam.
TWITTER:@spaldingbarker
Subscribe to DroneLife here.
On 20 May 2026, the Law Commission published its final report on aviation autonomy. Commissioned by the Department for Transport and the Civil Aviation Authority, the review addresses the legal barriers to safely deploying highly automated and autonomous systems in aviation. It focuses on three main use cases: drones, advanced air mobility such as vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOLs), and air traffic management. The overarching aim is to ensure that uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) can operate with safety levels equivalent to crewed flights.
A central element of the report is drawing a clear line between remotely piloted and autonomous operations. To ensure legal certainty regarding who is responsible for aviation safety, the commission recommends that any flight where a human pilot can intervene should be classed as remotely piloted, while any flight without this possibility is autonomous. It advises retaining the current legal definition of a remote pilot and aligning their responsibilities with those of a commander in commercial air transport operations.
For passenger-carrying remotely piloted operations, ensuring equivalent safety with crewed aircraft is paramount. The remote pilot will hold ultimate legal responsibility for flight preparation checks, such as ensuring the aircraft is airworthy and that cargo is secured. Furthermore, the remote pilot will have the responsibility to refuse transport to individuals under the influence of drink or drugs. They will also be granted the power to take reasonable measures, including authorising passenger restraint under the Civil Aviation Act 1982, to protect the aircraft and its occupants in emergency situations. Operators will be required to ensure that passengers can contact a crew member at all times.
When operations become fully autonomous, the responsibilities of the pilot will shift significantly to the UAS operator. The operator will be required to use an aircraft designed to comply with operational limitations and avoid the risk of collision. Mandatory flight data recorders are also recommended for autonomous drone and VTOL operations to facilitate accident investigations and improve long-term safety.
The report also examines civil and criminal liability when accidents happen. It states that the current strict liability system will continue to function effectively for air carriers, although product liability relating to artificial intelligence requires a broader review. In terms of criminal law, the commission recommends updating the offence of hijacking under the Aviation Security Act 1982. Recognising that uncrewed aircraft could be seized by technological means or hacking without a hijacker being present on board, the report urges the UK to implement the Beijing Protocol to expand the legal definition of hijacking.
Finally, to safely integrate uncrewed flights beyond the visual line of sight, the report calls for legislative change to accommodate the certification of uncrewed aircraft systems traffic management (UTM) providers. These services will supply vital digital information about potential hazards and weather to uncrewed aircraft, ensuring they can share the airspace safely with crewed flights.
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In a sharply worded filing with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), drone manufacturer Autel Robotics is pushing back against the agency’s decision to place its products on the FCC’s Covered List. The filing makes one point especially clear: Autel does not want to be treated as interchangeable with DJI.
The filing, submitted in response to the FCC’s recent Covered List actions, argues that the agency relied on broad national security assumptions instead of conducting an individualized review of Autel itself. The tone of the document is notably direct, signaling growing frustration among foreign drone manufacturers facing new restrictions in the United States.
At issue is the FCC’s expanding use of the Covered List, a national security framework originally focused on telecommunications infrastructure. In late 2025, the FCC moved to add all foreign-produced unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and certain critical drone components to the list, dramatically broadening the policy’s impact across the drone industry.
The move means that future products from affected companies may not receive the FCC authorizations needed for legal operation in the United States.
“Swept Into a Category”
Among other arguments, Autel’s filing repeatedly argues that the FCC failed to distinguish between companies, technologies, and supply chains.
Rather than evaluating Autel independently, the company argues, the FCC treated foreign drone manufacturers as a single category associated with broader geopolitical concerns.
The filing suggests that the FCC relied heavily on external determinations and generalized national security claims rather than evidence specific to Autel products or operations.
That distinction matters because the debate around drones in the United States has increasingly shifted away from individual manufacturers and toward broader supply chain policy.
In practical terms, the FCC’s current approach does not focus only on named companies. It also targets foreign-made drones and key components more broadly. Industry observers have noted that the shift represents a major expansion of the Covered List framework beyond its original telecommunications focus.
Autel’s filing pushes directly against that broader approach.
While the company stops short of attacking DJI directly, the message is difficult to miss: Autel believes the FCC improperly grouped very different companies together under a single regulatory framework.
The Covered List Debate Continues
The FCC’s Covered List has become one of the most significant regulatory issues facing the drone industry.
Originally created under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, the list identifies communications equipment and services that the FCC determines pose national security risks. Over time, the policy has expanded into the drone sector as lawmakers and regulators raised concerns about foreign-made aircraft and components.
The issue has become particularly important because FCC authorization affects whether new drone products can legally enter the U.S. market.
Current drones already in operation are generally unaffected. However, future products may face significant barriers if manufacturers cannot obtain FCC equipment authorization.
The FCC has also created limited pathways for exemptions and conditional approvals. Earlier this year, the agency released guidance outlining how some drone systems may qualify for authorization under specific conditions.
That process remains closely watched across the industry.
DJI Has Also Filed a Challenge
Autel is not alone in opposing the FCC’s actions.
DJI has also challenged the agency’s Covered List decision through both administrative filings and litigation. DJI’s arguments focus heavily on the impact to users, market access, and the FCC’s authority to impose broad restrictions on future products.
The parallel filings reveal an important shift in the drone industry.
For years, policy discussions often treated foreign drone manufacturers as a single issue tied to supply chain security. The current legal challenges suggest that manufacturers are increasingly trying to separate themselves from one another as regulatory pressure grows.
Autel’s filing may be the clearest example yet of that strategy.
Rather than arguing only against the restrictions themselves, the company is also arguing against being treated as part of a single category.
A Broader Industry Shift
The dispute comes as the United States continues efforts to strengthen domestic drone manufacturing and reduce reliance on overseas supply chains.
Federal agencies, lawmakers, and industry groups have all increased focus on building U.S.-based drone production capacity and securing access to critical components.
At the same time, the FCC’s actions are raising difficult questions about how broad future restrictions should become and how regulators should evaluate individual companies.
Autel’s filing highlights that tension directly.
As the FCC continues reshaping drone policy through supply chain regulation, manufacturers are signaling that they want company-specific scrutiny rather than industry-wide assumptions.
For now, the legal and regulatory battle continues. But Autel’s response makes one thing clear: not every drone manufacturer is willing to accept being treated as part of a single geopolitical category.
Read more:
Miriam McNabb is the Editor-in-Chief of DRONELIFE and CEO of JobForDrones, a professional drone services marketplace, and a fascinated observer of the emerging drone industry and the regulatory environment for drones. Miriam has penned over 3,000 articles focused on the commercial drone space and is an international speaker and recognized figure in the industry. Miriam has a degree from the University of Chicago and over 20 years of experience in high tech sales and marketing for new technologies.
For drone industry consulting or writing, Email Miriam.
TWITTER:@spaldingbarker
Subscribe to DroneLife here.
In 2012, the UK drone sector was still relatively small. Multirotors existed, commercial aerial work was growing, and the Civil Aviation Authority’s focus was broadly understandable: keep unmanned aircraft away from people, aircraft, congested areas and controlled airspace, and require permission for higher-risk or commercial activity.
By 2026, the picture has changed dramatically. The UK now has a layered system of registration, Flyer IDs, Operator IDs, Open/Specific/Certified categories, operational authorisations, SORA assessments, Operational Safety Objectives, containment evidence, Remote ID, UK class markings, SAIL markings, Recognised Assessment Entities for Flightworthiness, and a growing family of CAP 722 guidance documents.
The question is no longer whether drones should be regulated. They clearly should be. The real question is whether UK drone regulation has moved from proportionate safety management into a culture of compliance expansion, where each new risk produces another document, certificate, marking scheme, or approval pathway.
The early years: simple rules, clear principles
The CAA’s CAP 722 has existed since the early 2000s, but the period around 2012 was still comparatively simple. CAP 722’s revision history shows the fifth edition was published in August 2012, with updates to terms, definitions, procedures and human factors material. The major structural changes came later, particularly in 2015, when the document was completely restructured and the Operating Safety Case process became central to permissions for more complex unmanned aircraft operations. (Civil Aviation Authority)
That older approach had faults, but it had one major strength: it was relatively understandable. Operators generally knew the basics: remain visual line of sight, keep clear of people and property, stay away from airports, and seek CAA permission for commercial or higher-risk work. It was not perfect, but the compliance burden was still recognisable to small operators and manufacturers.
The 2015 introduction of the OSC process was arguably the first major paperwork escalation. It asked operators to explain their concept of operations, aircraft systems, safety mitigations and operational procedures. For serious commercial work, that made sense. But it also began the shift from “fly safely and demonstrate competence” towards “produce a large body of evidence to prove that you might fly safely.”
2018–2019: airport restrictions made sense
One of the more defensible changes was the strengthening of airport flight restriction zones. Following the increasing public concern around drones near airports, the UK introduced clearer height restrictions and restrictions around protected aerodromes. CAA guidance published in 2019 explained the 400 ft limit and the expanded Flight Restriction Zone system, including airport traffic zones and runway protection areas.
This was a sensible area for regulation. Airports are one of the few places where even a small drone can create a serious aviation hazard. The 2019 changes extended restriction zones to include runway protection extensions, commonly described as 5 km by 1 km zones from runway ends, which was aimed at protecting aircraft during take-off and landing. (GOV.UK)
Very few responsible drone operators would argue against clear airport restrictions. Flight Restriction Zones are a good example of regulation targeted at a real and obvious risk.
The problem is that this targeted logic has not always been maintained elsewhere.
2020 onwards: the European-style category system arrives
The next major shift came with the adoption of the European-style framework: Open, Specific and Certified categories. The idea was logical on paper. Low-risk operations sit in the Open Category. More complex or higher-risk operations sit in the Specific Category. Very high-risk operations fall into the Certified Category.
But the practical effect was another layer of complexity. Instead of a relatively direct permission process, operators now had to understand subcategories, registration requirements, competency requirements, operational authorisations, risk assessments, mitigations and supporting guidance.
CAP 722 itself has also become part of a much wider ecosystem. The current CAP 722 page describes it as CAA guidance and policy for unmanned aircraft system operations, but the CAA drone publications area now includes a large family of related documents, including CAP 722, CAP 722A, CAP 722D, CAP 722G, CAP 722H, CAP 722J, CAP 722K, CAP 722L and further supporting publications. (Civil Aviation Authority)
The CAA is careful to say CAP 722 is guidance rather than law. But for operators, manufacturers and consultants, guidance often becomes quasi-law. If a CAA document says something “should” be done, then in practice it can become very difficult to obtain an authorisation without doing it.
2025–2026: class marks, Remote ID, SORA and SAIL marking
By 2026, the regulatory stack becomes even heavier.
The CAA has confirmed UK class marking requirements for drones, with UK0 to UK6 classes setting product requirements such as reliability, geo-awareness, Remote ID, flashing lights, labelling and conformity assessment. The CAA says this is intended to support clearer and simpler rules, but it also introduces another product compliance layer for manufacturers and importers. (Civil Aviation Authority)
Remote ID is another example. The CAA describes Remote ID as a system that transmits identification and location information from a drone, usually by Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, to support police and enforcement activity. From 2026 and 2028, different categories of aircraft and operations become subject to Remote ID requirements, including requirements linked to UK class-marked aircraft. (Civil Aviation Authority)
Again, the purpose is understandable. Enforcement agencies need tools to identify irresponsible operators. But the practical burden falls on everyone, including responsible operators who are already registered, insured, trained and operating under permissions. RID also has technical flaws which would need addressing as currently it is to easy to Fake RID for a drone.
Then there is UK SORA. The CAA’s SORA process requires operators to assess ground risk, air risk, operational volume, contingency volume, ground risk buffer, adjacent areas, Specific Assurance and Integrity Level, Operational Safety Objectives, containment requirements and supporting evidence. (Civil Aviation Authority)
For complex operations, risk assessment is necessary. But SORA risks becoming a paperwork machine. Instead of one coherent safety case, an operator can end up managing a web of documents, evidence references, OSO compliance statements, containment arguments, aircraft evidence, operational evidence, training evidence and maintenance evidence.
The introduction of SAIL Mark certificates and Recognised Assessment Entities for Flightworthiness adds another layer again. The CAA says RAE(F)s assess technical features and flightworthiness, while SAIL Mark certificates demonstrate that a UAS meets requirements linked to UK SORA SAIL levels. (Civil Aviation Authority) CAP 722K, first issued in March 2025, sets out policy and administrative guidance for UAS designers and RAE(F)s seeking SAIL Mark certification. (Civil Aviation Authority)
This is where many manufacturers and operators start to ask whether regulation has crossed a line. If a drone already uses standard components, radio modules, electronics and systems that have their own conformity evidence, how many times should the same basic compliance be rechecked? At what point does a safety process become a market barrier?
The safety record question
The most uncomfortable question for regulators is this: where is the fatality record that justifies the scale of expansion?
The CAA’s 2024 Annual Safety Review says there were around 720,000 registered RPAS users, made up of approximately 450,000 Flyer IDs and 270,000 Operator IDs. It should be noted people that stop flying drones still have Flyer IDs for years after they have stopped flying so the answer to how many are actually operating or flying drones will be closer to 270,000 operator ID number overall.
It also reports around 2,500 operational authorisations and 21,000 remote pilots with competency qualifications. In 2024, the CAA recorded 55 RPAS accidents and serious incidents, a 31% decrease from 2023. (Civil Aviation Authority)
The same review states that fatal injury reports in 2024 represented 0.02% of all occurrence reports and that all of those fatal injury reports involved general aviation aircraft. (Civil Aviation Authority)
That does not mean drones are risk-free. A falling aircraft can injure someone. A drone near an airport can create serious consequences. The AAIB and CAA rightly require reporting of accidents and serious incidents, and the CAA says occurrence reporting is intended to support safety learning rather than blame. (Civil Aviation Authority)
But if the UK civilian multirotor sector has not produced the kind of fatality record that was once feared, then the regulatory response should be tested against real evidence. Rules should be proportionate to actual harm, not hypothetical worst-case scenarios layered on top of one another indefinitely.
Has regulation gone too far?
In some areas, no. Airport Flight Restriction Zones make sense. Basic registration makes sense. Competency tests make sense for heavier or higher-risk drones. Operational authorisations make sense for operations near people, infrastructure, controlled airspace or complex environments.
But the broader direction is harder to defend.
The UK has moved from a relatively simple safety model to a compliance stack. A responsible operator or manufacturer now faces not just operational rules, but class markings, Remote ID, SORA, SAIL, RAE(F) assessments, evidence matrices, OSO mapping, containment arguments, competency levels and a growing CAP 722 document family.
This is regulatory bloat.
The danger is that the system starts to reward paperwork more than safety. A small manufacturer can spend months producing evidence packs, paying consultants, chasing assessments and cross-referencing guidance documents, while an irresponsible operator can still buy a cheap drone and ignore the rules entirely.
That is the core failure of over-complex regulation: it burdens the compliant while doing little to stop the reckless.
Are policymakers just justifying their jobs?
It is probably too simplistic to say CAA policymakers are merely trying to justify their jobs. The CAA has statutory duties. It has to respond to government, public concern, airport disruption, international rulemaking, police enforcement needs and rapid technology change.
But it is fair to ask whether the policy culture has become self-expanding. Every new framework creates new guidance. Every guidance document creates new interpretation. Every interpretation creates a need for consultants, assessors, templates, evidence packs and further CAA review.
At some point, the process becomes its own industry.
The CAA should be challenged to answer a simple question for every new requirement: what specific risk does this reduce, and what evidence shows that the reduction is worth the cost?
If the answer is clear, the rule should stay. If the answer is vague, the rule should be simplified or removed.
A better way forward
The UK does not need deregulation. It needs proportional regulation.
Keep airport restrictions. Keep sensible height limits. Keep registration and competency where the aircraft or operation presents a real risk. Keep operational authorisations for complex work.
But reduce duplication. Stop turning every safety concern into another certificate or marking scheme. Make SORA usable by normal operators, not just consultants. Ensure SAIL marking does not become an innovation tax. Review guidance regularly and remove obsolete layers. Most importantly, measure regulatory burden against actual accident and injury data.
The drone industry has matured. The rules should mature too.
From 2012 to 2026, UK drone regulation has gone from broad safety principles to a dense compliance ecosystem. Some of that evolution was necessary. Much of it now looks excessive.
If the goal is safer skies, regulation must remain clear, targeted and evidence-led. If the result is simply more forms, more marks, more certificates and more cost, then the system is no longer just managing risk. It is manufacturing bureaucracy.
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With an extensive 30-year career as a police officer, Simon’s current tasks include delivering the programme against the force’s strategy and reducing disruption across the rail sector.
He also leads on communication with aviation, risk and regulatory contractors, and oversees work on risk quantification and the safe and responsible implementation of a BVLOS capability for the police force.
Simon has been working on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems since 2019, under the NPCC Counter Drones portfolio and as an embedded member of the Home Office Counter Drones Unit, and took on his current role in April 2025.
What fundamental problem were you trying to solve when developing the drone-in-a-box programme, and how did you prioritise early use cases such as trespass, obstruction, or cable theft?
Defining the problem space was a key activity as we sought to develop a BVLOS drone capability. We identified a number of use cases and prioritised trespass and disruption, because that actually covers most of the use cases anyway.
From there we identified that the drone-in-a-box solution is really well suited to covering our trespass and disruption hotspots.
What does success look like in the next 12 months for your team? Which metrics (e.g., reduction in delays, faster incident response, cost savings, officer time released) matter most?
All of those! We have done some benchmarking of benefits and once our drone-in-a-boxes start generating data we can look at benefits realisation.
We will identify a number of key metrics and how we can measure any benefits (which may be financial or time related for example), plus be able to articulate the benefits in using the drones to pro-actively patrol these locations.
BTP is the first UK force to routinely operate under State Aircraft BVLOS provisions. How did you build a legally robust, repeatable framework around that?
Yes, although other forces also have a similar capability, all operating slightly differently. But, we are
operating at a larger scale than anyone else.
The first step for us was to obtain legal advice, which gave us the basis to proceed – we were the
first force to do this and we shared the advice with our policing colleagues. The framework we use developed the force’s already mature drone operation and processes and is based around a ‘5 Towers model’: Leadership Governance and Capability Management, Risk Management, Competency Management, Fleet and Mission Systems Management, and Flight Operations Management.
Image courtesy of the British Transport Police
How closely does your operational model align to the UK CAA’s CAP3182 Future of Flight BVLOS Roadmap?
We work closely with our biggest partner, Network Rail. They are currently progressing a SORA application for drone-in-a-box based on our processes, technology and methodology, whereas we use State Aircraft exemptions.
We operate within regulation where possible, with an acceptance that some policing operations cannot be catered for by current regulation and that’s when we need to utilise State Aircraft exemptions, with an appropriate means by which the regulator can ensure these operations are safe.
How have you approached detect-and-avoid and airspace deconfliction, especially considering possible interactions with NPAS, HEMS, or other emergency aviation assets?
NPAS and HEMS are our biggest risk, given that we are effectively conducting all our drone-in-a-box operations in an Atypical Airspace Environment, below 200 feet.
To that end, we use existing policing technology to be aware of where and when both are operating. In addition, we are working closely with Dronecloud and Network Rail on a UTM system for the railway as well as others on a form of Electronic Conspicuity using novel sensors.
We have developed a means to use transponders on all our drone-in-a-box drones, which means we can be seen. Lastly, good communication with both our own and other users is essential!
What is your strategy for dealing with critical events like GNSS disruption, C2 link loss, or EMI around railway power infrastructure?
Having a background in Counter Drones, I know that there can be some disruption, although it is less than people think. Link loss is more common, particularly at lower levels around infrastructure, so we use a mesh network to increase signal reliability and the telephony network as a failsafe.
Image courtesy of the British Transport Police
Your remote operations centre at London Bridge is impressive. How do operators coordinate drone dispatch, mission approval, and real-time decision support from the control room?
Thank you! Our operations room has been built from scratch, with no real blueprint for using multiple drone-in-a-boxes.
What we have done is to ensure we can integrate with existing operations, based around our current drone capability, using the same processes.
How is live drone data fed into incident response workflows? Who sees what, and how does drone
footage accelerate on-scene decision-making?
As mentioned, we use existing processes, so there is no real change to the way of working for us. We can get imagery to key decision-makers across both the BTP and Network Rail, but clearly we need to make sure those decision-makers understand who is the key decision-maker in any incident. There is two-way communication with the pilots as well, so the drone can be re-directed as required.
What training and competency framework did you build for BVLOS operators?
We follow the NPCC guidance on training for pilots (which does include a BVLOS element), but have developed our own training for what we do as operating drone-in-a-box is uniquely different.
Image courtesy of the British Transport Police
Was there any resistance internally, and how did you help frontline officers trust an autonomous asset arriving ahead of them?
Communication is important, particularly getting across that we’re not replacing officers or taking away options to use the drones we have, that we’re simply focussing on our trespass and disruption hotspots.
We’re also managing expectations by communicating things like the locations we have the drone-in a-box, how far we can fly and how long the drone can be airborne.
We’re in a good place as most officers are now used to working with drones and this is just an
extension of that capability.
What privacy safeguards guide how you collect, store, review, and delete drone imagery captured
near stations, homes, or public spaces?
We have very strict rules relating to data and privacy, as you would expect. We only record incidents
if there is a policing purpose, operating with a pilot and a tactical flight officer, plus a supervisor, so
the safeguards are there. In addition, we record the room (mostly for safety reasons should an accident occur), but this adds to the level of professionalism we require.
How do you secure the box, the drone, and your communications channels against tampering, interference, or cyber threats?
All our equipment goes through a cyber-assurance process. It’s not about the imagery or necessarily the data, it is about unwarranted access to our wider systems. We have layered security for our hardware, not only to prevent damage or tampering, but to prevent accidents with uninvolved persons who may be nearby.
Image from Moonrock’s visit to BTP in 2026
How do you collaborate with Network Rail, TOCs/FOCs, and infrastructure partners to ensure seamless integration between policing, rail operations, and drone data flows?
This is a really good question. We have recently begun work on a Concept of Joint Operations, supported by both the BTP Chief Constable and the CEO of Network Rail. Here we’re looking at coordinating our drone efforts across rail, using each other’s assets and sharing drone imagery whether for infrastructure inspection or searching for trespassers. There is lots to do here and for us to look at, from a National Drone Flight Operations Room to a National Drone Response Team!
What does a scalable national deployment model look like in terms of infrastructure density, maintenance, operator staffing, and cost-effectiveness?
I think there has to be a limit to the number of assets we have, the real key to this is flexibility. The ability to move assets dependent on demand has to be the most cost-effective solution. The challenge is that our assets are adding value and that we can demonstrate the benefits!
What single enabler – technical, regulatory, or organisational – would most accelerate safe, scalable BVLOS policing in the UK? And how can industry partners best support that future?
I think the first enabler I would want is an agreed regulatory model that allows us to operate within regulation where we can, but where we need to we have a framework for the use of ‘State Aircraft’
exemptions to achieve policing objectives.
This in itself presents an opportunity for industry players to partner with policing or other agencies,
which would benefit the industry more widely.
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The Buffalo-based battery materials company debuts NDAA-compliant pouch cells with up to 80% more energy density than standard Li-ion.
Natrion has launched defense-optimized battery cells for uncrewed systems including drones, surface and underwater vessels, ground vehicles, and humanoids. The Buffalo, New York-based company announced the new product lines on May 14, 2026. The cells deliver nearly 80% more energy density than available Li-ion alternatives.
The new lines, called Cirrus and Stratus, build on Natrion’s longstanding work with the U.S. Air Force and Navy. Both branches have awarded the company multiple contracts since its inception.
Cirrus and Stratus Reshape the Attritable Drone Battery
Cirrus uses an anode-free architecture, and Stratus uses lithium-metal. Both rely on Natrion’s proprietary Active Separator material.
The pouch cells are dimensionally equivalent to existing battery packs built from 21700-type Li-ion cylindrical cells. That means Cirrus and Stratus packs can drop into virtually any system with the same form factor.
Operators gain up to 80% more energy capacity with virtually no added weight. Standard Li-ion cells top out at roughly 250 to 280 watt-hours per kilogram. Natrion’s anode-free cells exceed 450 Wh/kg.
The cells deliver 100 to 250-plus charge-discharge cycles. That lifespan fits attritable, high-performance platforms where survivability and replacement cost both matter.
“The defense sector in particular desperately needs better-performing, US-made battery cells that are right-sized and optimized for these applications,” said Alex Kosyakov, cofounder and CEO at Natrion. “Despite their vastly different requirements, current military systems have long been forced to rely on one-size-fits-all lithium-ion batteries that increase battery costs and waste precious rare minerals, while being poorly optimized for their mission. It’s a lose-lose. Today, we’re fixing that: creating mission-optimized battery cells at a dramatically lower price point, with better endurance and capability, reduced reliance on rare minerals, and manufactured on American soil.”
Open-Air Manufacturing Cuts Cost and Aging Time
Standard Li-ion cells are typically assembled in specialized dry rooms with precise humidity control. Cells can then take weeks of aging before shipment.
Natrion designed Cirrus for low-cost, open-air assembly with standard equipment. The cells require less than two days of aging.
The cells are certifiable to NDAA Section 842 supply chain requirements. Natrion is shipping samples for user testing today.
“Higher-energy density Li-ion cells exist, but the tradeoff for performance is often much higher cost,” said Philip Lee, Natrion’s VP of Business Development for Asia-Pacific and a former naval aviator in the Republic of Korea Navy. “Attritable uncrewed systems need inexpensive power sources that are readily replaceable with robust, local production supply chains, in addition to being very high in energy density. That is what we are offering with Cirrus and Stratus.”
“This dramatically lowers capital and operational costs, allowing us to replace batteries at unprecedented rates. The improved energy density enables extended duration and new mission capabilities that Li-ion simply can’t match,” Lee added.
Natrion’s existing high-volume Active Separator manufacturing line in Buffalo accelerates the rollout. The company partners with the U.S. Department of Defense, LG Energy Solution, and leading research institutions.
More information is available at Natrion.
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]]>The first person to sound the alarm was an airport employee who would later become the case’s star witness. Spotting two strange objects hovering and darting across the evening sky, she didn’t hesitate: “There are two drones. They are large. It’s not toys,” she reported up the chain. Within minutes, Danish airspace was closed to everything except emergency landings.
What she saw that night, she later described in vivid detail. One object was a large, square shape, roughly 1.5 by 1.5 metres, that reminded her of a robotic lawnmower with rounded corners and a propeller at each corner. The second was smaller, white, round, and faster. Both had bright white lights. Yet the witness was remarkably candid about her own inexperience: she had never seen a real drone in person in her entire life, only on television, in films, or in the news. “I have not seen any drones physically… but I explain from what I feel, and then it was a drone,” she told investigators. To her, the slow hover that could suddenly accelerate, the propellers, and the lights all added up.
Police, however, reached a very different conclusion. After interviewing her four times and having experts analyse the phone video filmed by her colleague, they were clear: there were no drones. The large moving light captured on the grainy footage was a school training plane from Roskilde that had been cleared to fly in the area. The small, fast-moving “zigzagging” object was simply lens flare, a common reflection inside the camera lens caused by bright external lights. When the witness watched the same video again alongside journalists from Frihedsbrevet, she herself admitted that, yes, it could easily be mistaken for a small aircraft. Police delivered the same message to several of her colleagues: what they had seen were camera artefacts, ordinary aircraft… or, in one later case, a police helicopter.
That last detail reveals a classic false-confirmation loop. Once the initial drone report went out, authorities scrambled a helicopter from the police tactical unit to hunt for the suspected intruders. A colleague who spotted the helicopter later that evening naturally assumed it was yet another drone, only to be told by police that he had actually seen their own response aircraft. The very act of sending up a helicopter in pursuit of reported drones created a new “sighting” that seemed to confirm the original alarm.
Danish public broadcaster DR this week aired a documentary titled “Droner over Danmark” that further underlined concerns about the authorities’ handling of the events, including reports (as first reported by sUAS News) of the Danish military likely mistaking a Norwegian passenger airliner for a drone and firing upon it over Billund.
You can watch the documentary here: https://www.dr.dk/drtv/program/droner-over-danmark_596478
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The UK Civil Aviation Authority’s introduction of the Recognised Assessment Entity for Flightworthiness, or RAE(F), and the associated SAIL Marking system was presented as a way to support the rollout of UK SORA and help operators demonstrate that their unmanned aircraft systems are safe for more complex Specific Category operations.
In principle, few people in the drone industry would object to proportionate safety assurance. The problem is not the intent. The problem is the way the system risks becoming another costly layer of
assessment on top of standards, certificates, declarations and component-level compliance work that manufacturers have already completed.
The CAA says RAE(F)s are approved to assess whether the technical features of a UAS meet UK SORA requirements, including design, construction and flying characteristics. It also states that designers seeking a SAIL Mark must ask an RAE(F) to assess the UAS, after which the RAE(F) advises the CAA whether the requirements have been met. (Civil Aviation Authority)
That sounds reasonable until you look at what many drone manufacturers are actually building. A modern drone is typically assembled from radios, flight controllers, GPS receivers, batteries, transmitters, electronic speed controllers and other components that already sit within an established conformity framework. Radio equipment is already subject to applicable radio and EMC requirements. CE-marked products and components are already required to demonstrate compliance with applicable Union harmonisation legislation.
EASA’s own guidance for manufacturers confirms that drones are subject to legislation such as the
Radio Equipment Directive and Machinery Directive, and that manufacturers must demonstrate compliance through the defined conformity procedures before affixing CE marking. (EASA)
So the question the industry should be asking is simple: what additional safety value is actually being created by the RAE(F) process, and what is merely a re-check of paperwork that already exists?
The SAIL Mark system is described by the CAA as optional; CAP 722K explicitly states that there is “no obligation” for a UAS designer to SAIL mark their aircraft in the UK. However, the practical reality may become very different. If operators increasingly need SAIL marked aircraft to make UK SORA applications easier, then an “optional” scheme can quickly become a commercial necessity. Once that happens, manufacturers who cannot afford the cost, delay and administrative workload of SAIL Marking may find themselves excluded from parts of the market, even when their aircraft are built from compliant, traceable and already-certified components.
This is where the system becomes problematic. The RAE(F) does not replace proper engineering by the manufacturer. It does not design the aircraft. It does not manufacture the aircraft. In many cases, it will not add meaningful physical test data beyond what the manufacturer has already generated.
CAP 722K requires the designer to submit evidence data to the RAE(F), and the RAE(F) must verify the designer’s compliance against the agreed compliance basis and approach. That is fundamentally an evidence-review model.
Evidence review has value where the aircraft is novel, high-risk, complex, or where the manufacturer is claiming safety functions that are not already proven. But it is much harder to justify when the review becomes a costly confirmation that standard components meet standards they have already been tested against. For example, CAP 722K’s C3 link requirements require data such as C3 link performance, RF spectrum and environmental conditions, plus evidence that the remote pilot can monitor C3 link performance.
Those are important issues, but for many systems the underlying radio modules, output powers,
frequency bands and conformity evidence already exist. The danger is that the RAE(F) becomes an expensive intermediary between the manufacturer’s existing technical file and the CAA’s approval process.
The CAA’s own charging structure shows the wider cost environment that manufacturers and operators now face. For 2026/27, UK SORA-based Operational Authorisation charges range from £2,422 at SAIL 1 to £17,300 at SAIL 5 and SAIL 6, with additional assessment charges possible at £346 per hour. These are CAA charges, not necessarily the full commercial cost of engaging an RAE(F), but they demonstrate the direction of travel: higher SAIL means higher cost, more documentation, more assessment and more delay. (Civil Aviation Authority) EASA’s Design Verification Report system raises similar concerns. EASA states that DVR costs are based on actual time spent assessing documentation, charged at €250 per hour, and that the duration depends heavily on system complexity and the manufacturer’s responsiveness. Again, this is a documentation-heavy model that may be appropriate for higher-risk or more novel designs, but it risks becoming disproportionate when applied too broadly. (EASA)
The strongest argument for SAIL Marking is that it allows a manufacturer to prove the technical aspects once, so operators do not have to repeat the same evidence for every Operational Authorisation. That is a valid objective. The CAA itself says that as more SAIL-marked UAS become available, operators will be able to use them to comply with certain UK SORA technical requirements. (Civil Aviation Authority)
But that benefit only materialises if the process is quick, affordable, consistent and genuinely additive. If the system is slow, expensive and mostly duplicates existing component compliance, then it will not accelerate innovation. It will tax it.
This concern is not just theoretical. In consultation feedback submitted to the CAA, the Royal Aeronautical Society warned that limited numbers of organisations providing RAE(F) services could increase industry costs, extend authorisation timelines and limit growth. The same response noted that many UK drone manufacturers are SMEs, often developing products with limited revenue, and that overly burdensome regulation can make compliance expensive and time-consuming during the critical period before a product is commercialised.
That is the core issue. The UK drone industry is not made up only of large aerospace primes with dedicated certification departments. Much of the innovation comes from small manufacturers, engineering-led start-ups and specialist operators building practical systems for real-world use cases. These companies already face costs for product development, testing, insurance, manufacturing, software, documentation, operational approvals, training, export compliance and market access. Adding another expensive assessment layer may satisfy an administrative need, but it can easily become a barrier to entry.
There is also a risk of regulatory mismatch. Drone technology evolves quickly. Components change, firmware changes, radio modules change and payloads change. A certification-style model that works for traditional aviation can become misaligned with the pace of unmanned aircraft development. The more the approval system struggles to keep up with real product cycles, the more manufacturers will either delay innovation, avoid the UK market, or design around the approval process rather than around the best technical solution.
The answer is not to abandon safety assurance. The answer is proportionality.
For low and medium-risk SAIL levels, the CAA should allow more reliance on manufacturer declarations, existing CE/UKCA/RED evidence, component certificates, conformity documentation and controlled internal test reports. RAE(F) involvement should focus on genuinely operation-specific or system-level risks: containment, failure modes, command-and-control resilience, geofencing, flight termination, software behaviour and manufacturing consistency. It should not become a paid exercise in re-reading radio module certificates and checking that standard parts already comply with standards they were built to meet.
A better model would separate “paperwork already proven elsewhere” from “system-level flightworthiness claims.” If a manufacturer uses a compliant radio module within its rated power, frequency and environmental envelope, that should not need a full reassessment. If a manufacturer claims that its drone can safely terminate flight, contain itself within a defined volume, detect C3 degradation or maintain operational control in a swarm, then that is where independent assessment can add value.
The UK has an opportunity to build a sensible, risk-based drone approval system. But if RAE(F) and SAIL Marking become too expensive, too slow, or too focused on duplicating existing standards, the result will not be a thriving ecosystem. It will be a smaller market, fewer manufacturers, slower product development and less innovation.
The CAA may see the creation of the RAE(F) system as a step forward. For parts of the industry, it may well be. But unless the system is kept proportionate, transparent and affordable, it risks becoming exactly what manufacturers fear: an expensive double-check on compliant products, paid for by the very companies the UK needs if it wants to lead in unmanned aviation.
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Drone delivery stories often focus on the aircraft. Payloads. Batteries. Range. Regulations.
But a recent partnership between Wing and Papa Johns suggests the commercial drone industry may be entering a different phase. One where the drone itself becomes only one part of a much larger autonomous commerce system.
The companies announced a drone delivery pilot tied to what Papa Johns describes as “end-to-end agentic commerce.” The phrase sounds like classic tech jargon. Behind the buzzwords, however, is a meaningful shift in how retailers, AI systems, and autonomous logistics networks may eventually work together.
The pilot itself is modest. Customers in the Charlotte, North Carolina area can order select menu items for drone delivery through Wing’s platform.
Interestingly, the initial focus is not traditional pizza. Instead, the first drone-delivered products are toasted Papa Johns Papadias sandwiches.That detail matters.
Pizza remains surprisingly difficult for drone delivery. Large pizza boxes create aerodynamic and packaging challenges, and maintaining food quality during flight is complicated. Toasted sandwiches are easier to package, easier to stabilize, and better suited to current drone payload systems. (In a recent DRONELIFE Interview, drone delivery company Flytrex says they’ve solved the pizza problem.)
In many ways, the Papadia may be a more realistic bridge between traditional food delivery and scalable autonomous logistics. But the bigger story may not be the food at all.
What “Agentic Commerce” Actually Means
The phrase “agentic commerce” has begun appearing more frequently in AI and retail discussions. Google Cloud describes it as a new commerce model where AI agents can increasingly act on behalf of consumers.
Unlike traditional apps, which wait for users to manually enter commands, agentic systems are designed to help manage goals and workflows. The “end-to-end” portion is equally important. Historically, automation in retail has been fragmented. Ordering systems, kitchen operations, dispatch software, delivery networks, and customer communication tools often operate separately.
Agentic commerce attempts to connect those layers into one coordinated system.
IBM describes the concept as AI agents acting “on behalf of consumers.” In practical terms, that means future retail systems may increasingly handle routine decisions automatically, from recommending products to coordinating fulfillment and delivery timing.
That may sound futuristic, but the early pieces are already emerging.
Meet Lou AI
Papa Johns recently introduced “Lou AI,” which the company describes as a next-generation digital pizza assistant built on Google Cloud technology.
According to the company, Lou AI is designed to personalize ordering, simplify group purchases, recommend deals, and adapt in real time. RetailTech Innovation Hub described the platform as an “always-on digital concierge.”
Today, systems like Lou AI still function largely as enhanced customer interfaces. But they point toward a broader future where AI increasingly manages the retail workflow itself.
Instead of manually navigating menus, future customers might simply tell an AI assistant to order dinner for the family at a certain time. The system could potentially determine likely preferences, account for dietary restrictions, apply discounts, predict preparation timing, and coordinate delivery automatically.
That is where drone delivery becomes especially interesting.
The Drone Is Only One Layer
For years, drone delivery companies focused primarily on aviation challenges such as beyond visual line of sight operations, detect-and-avoid systems, battery life, payload capacity, and regulatory approvals.
Those challenges remain significant. But the industry has increasingly learned that flying the drone is often the easiest part.
Scaling delivery economically is much harder.
The real complexity involves coordinating restaurant workflows, inventory management, dispatch timing, routing efficiency, packaging, weather response, and customer communication. Many drone delivery pilots proved technically successful but struggled to scale because retail logistics are inherently complicated.
This is why the Wing and Papa Johns announcement may represent something larger than another restaurant delivery test.
The companies are attempting to connect:
- AI-driven ordering
- fulfillment automation
- retail operations
- autonomous aviation
into one integrated system.
In that model, the drone becomes less of a standalone product and more of an infrastructure layer inside a larger autonomous commerce network.
Why Pizza Is Still a Useful Test Case
Pizza delivery has long served as a proving ground for futuristic delivery concepts. Autonomous cars, sidewalk robots, and drones all seem to begin with food delivery for a reason.
Restaurant delivery combines high order frequency, predictable suburban geography, repeat customer behavior, and time-sensitive fulfillment. That makes it valuable training ground for AI-assisted logistics systems.
Even the shift toward Papadias instead of pizza reflects how the industry is evolving from flashy demonstrations toward operational practicality.
The focus is moving from whether a drone can carry food to whether autonomous delivery systems can operate reliably at scale.
That is a far more important question.
The Bigger Industry Shift
The Wing and Papa Johns partnership also reflects a larger transition happening across retail and logistics. Companies including Amazon Prime Air, Zipline, and Flytrex are increasingly building integrated delivery ecosystems rather than standalone drone programs.
The likely winners in autonomous delivery may not simply be the companies with the best aircraft. They may be the companies that best combine AI systems, customer data, fulfillment operations, retail integrations, and autonomous logistics into one seamless workflow.
That could eventually expand well beyond restaurant delivery into pharmacy delivery, grocery fulfillment, healthcare logistics, and suburban same-hour commerce.
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Miriam McNabb is the Editor-in-Chief of DRONELIFE and CEO of JobForDrones, a professional drone services marketplace, and a fascinated observer of the emerging drone industry and the regulatory environment for drones. Miriam has penned over 3,000 articles focused on the commercial drone space and is an international speaker and recognized figure in the industry. Miriam has a degree from the University of Chicago and over 20 years of experience in high tech sales and marketing for new technologies.
For drone industry consulting or writing, Email Miriam.
TWITTER:@spaldingbarker
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